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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellant Sel va Eugi n McGi ntj , by ai id
through his attorney, James "Tucker" Hansen, hereby responds to
tin. Brief of Appel 1 ee, i n regard to the following issues:
Issue I.

Should the trial court's finding chat the

ranch property was marital property be allowed when the
evidence shuw1. lh.il the pi opert y was nwiwil Iby the plaintiff
prior to the marriage?
Issue II.
ranch proper ty

Did ri> trial court improperly divide the

by awar<

-

* :*,

>-.-••.. r-r the

evidence showed that the plaintiff contributed substantia]1y
more to paying off the property?

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are set forth on pages 3-7 of
Plaintiff/Appellant Selva McGinty's appeal brief, and will be
referenced throughout this reply brief.
ARGUMENT
Defendant has subdivided her brief into five separate
subsections, to which plaintiff will respond in order.
I.

PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE AND HAS
SHOWN THAT IT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
Defendant is improperly asserting that Plaintiff is

making a one-sided manipulation of the evidence by not
marshalling all facts.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), stated that for a factual resolution to
be overturned, the appellant must "first marshall all the
evidence supporting the trial court,s finding and then
demonstrate that that evidence, when compared to the contrary
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear
error has been committed."

745 P.2d at 1278 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff has mentioned the relevant facts in regard to the
case (Brief of Appellant, pp. 3-7), and argues that these facts
do not support the trial court judgement.
For example, in appellant's brief, Plaintiff notes in
Statements of Facts 5, 8, 14, 17, 19, and 20 that Defendant
2

advanced iiuncis to either Plaintiff c: L^ uie ranch account at
various times,

(Brief of Appe . -

yp. 4-7). Th i s e s ' I dence,

absent contrary evidence, might be construed tc support the
f

^ng that the ranci *•
marital property.

venture and

However, Plai nti

trary

evidence, as required by Newmeyer, which indicates that these
ddvaiKros u

-

and were at least partially paid

back by Plaintiff.

Statement of Facts 21 cites trial testimony

indicating that $'.-.::

* •,

$13,638.47 final payment on
Defendants funds, was repaid

to Defendant by Plaintiff.

(Brief cf

*r>pel ] ant p. 7 ) .

In addition, it should be noted that Plaintiff's
testimony deninj, U M I tuncis .tdvuitopfi tu h i in by defendant were
used to make the earnest money payment and down payment on the
ranch.

(TT pp. 24-25).

transferred iroi

Also, when testifying regarding funds

'self to Pl.ii * . -

•---*• - ^.-v •

that these were "funds that [she] had loaned

*• Dwledged
-nat he had

advised [her] that he was going f o x^t\ back to [her] "
178-79),

As discussed be] ow In

(TT pp.

! < licse transactions

do not appear to meet the requisite elements to support the
trial court's finding that a joint venture existed prior to the
parties marriage.
" » 3, Defendant is quite subjective in
l«il»» J i

presentations Plaintiff's references to
3

testimony, and in discounting evidence that tends to support
Plaintiff's position.

For example, Defendant asserts without

adequate support that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the final
payoff on the ranch is "inconsistent," "contradictory and selfserving," that cross-examination "clearly demonstrated that
Cotton had no memory of the events surrounding the final payoff
of the ranch," that "[h]e couldn't remember the payoff amount
for the ranch, where the money came from, how it got into the
joint account to make the ranch payment, or how much money, if
any, had ever been paid back to Lee."
16-17).

(Brief of Appellee, pp.

To the contrary, upon direct examination Plaintiff

recalled that the payoff amount had been "[t]hirteen thousand
some $600," (TT p. 46), a figure quite close to the $13,638.47
actual payoff amount.

He acknowledged that the majority of the

payoff amount had come from Defendant's personal funds, but
recalled that she had been paid back $9,111.

(TT p. 46)("On

one occasion, she took $4,111 and on another occasion there was
$3,000 and another occasion there was $2,000.").

Defendant

ignores that testimony and asserts that "[a] review of [pages
46-47] indicates that no such statement [that Cotton paid Lee
back $9,111.00] was ever made and that Cotton was confused and
disoriented."

(Brief of Appellee, p. 16).

Defendant has also continually cited to the trial
court's findings of facts regarding matters which are otherwise
4

i Lin Ifar,

Do f «• in I. nit

n resents these matters to the appellate

court as il they were established facts.

When, as here, the

findings of fact of the trial court are being appealed, a cite
I" <

the" f i iiiJ i r\<\-\ ill lui'l rat'hf-r than to the record of

proceedings below can mean no more than a restatement ol how
? =r - ruled.

The reviewing court should look past

defei*

-

determine the accuracy

• r evidence to

> inaccuracy o! tiit findings o* -fan.*.

In that regard, this court should note that portions
of

^ t '? i ' i a t • -in* 'Hi

supported.

u l 1 r-jct c*. rii'i1 i iiiJ I

"Jiff i e i e n t

r

For example, in Appellee's brief, Statement

Fact

8 cites on] y the Findings of fact as support for the assertion
that Defendant provided Appe] lai it:

* -

i

•-

in

the acquisition of joint venture properties and a retirement
home,

(Brief of Appellee p. 5 ) . Defendant disputes that

finding, and asserts that funds trans let ICMII ( rum Defendant I'M
Plaintiff were merely loaned.

When testifying regarding funds

transferred from Plaintiff to Defendant, Plaintiff acknowledged
that these were "funds that [she] had loaned t", h i in !.hat he had
advised [her] that he was going to pay back to [her] "
178-7*Vj

a i man

(TT pp.

' ;_unds to the Plaintiff does not indicate a

purchase of an ownership interest i n the ranch.
Defendant has also faulted Plaintiff for his lack of
ms that advances made to him
5

by Defendant were loans. However, it should be pointed out
that Defendant did the bookkeeping for the ranch, and was thus
more familiar with the financial records. (TT 43, 189).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE RANCH WAS A JOINT
VENTURE AND MARITAL ASSET IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENTLY
SPECIFIC FINDINGS, NOR BY THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE.
The trial court held that the Ranch was a joint

venture and a marital asset of Plaintiff and Defendant.
10).

(FF

It apparently based this conclusion on some general

findings: Lee signed and participated in listing agreements for
sale of portions of the ranch; she provided the funds for half
of the lump sum payments (the court does not list the evidence
from which it made this conclusion); the installment payments
ultimately came from joint funds; she made substantial
contributions both before and during the marriage by way of
maintenance, preservation, and protection of the ranch; and,
she made substantial contributions of her sole and separate
funds.

Plaintiff asserts that the conclusion that the ranch

was a joint venture and marital asset is not supported by
sufficiently specific findings, and is not supported by the
evidence when viewed as a whole.
The trial court's findings must be "sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached."

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App.
6

1987}

"[T]he court's divisi.;

- ^he estate c ..

undisturbed when we -..-.- /<,* .-resent- ; -,th

•- ablished I;.

:1 v. Hall, 858 * .. <*

(quoting Burt v. Bu-t

-

^ *r P .

799 P ?d 116^. ] ! \

^-

jemonstrdif u* .

elements cf a jvim ventuithis

diffident findings

, - ^

^*

•->t • ^ ^'^nrements for a holdiou that the ranch was

a
a _eint venture die:

r exist prjoi "

Utah law v1-^^ n^*" ^ :

* n* rartieb

rudrrir. .r,

^indi^ th*

was

marital property pr
Defendant's marriaae o; '• ne 18, 19*"'•
uLaii

UJLU

etore iajption of

not rec-^ri"^ --i

unsolemnizcu relatiOiioL^ as a marri^rre. c
parties may have a- ten
,a

_L

tei-

i othei respects as spouses.**
r u

"

u

, ,f

"

N

|-'^

-<•-

Layton v. Layton,

Wa3 ters

i|j ~+-1 nq"

) .

Section 30-i-4,5 m*:v not be applied retroactively

at 68.

iioxaxng tha*~ * ne

tranch was maritai -t rupeity , . « . .

i ^ ..^emnization c

parties' marriage, defendant is torced t.

* ,\

*ie

the existence
tiie ranch

7

prior to the parties' marriage.

Regarding a joint venture

relationship, the Utah Supreme Court said:
The requirements for the relationship are not
exactly defined, but certain elements are essential:
the parties must combine their property, money,
effects, skill, labor, and knowledge. As a general
rule, there must be a community of interest in the
performance of the common purpose, a joint
proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual
right to control, a right to share in the profits,
and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a
duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987) (quoting
Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974)).
Plaintiff asserts that when both supporting and
contrary evidence is considered, the essential elements of a
joint venture in the ranch did not exist prior to Plaintiff and
Defendant's marriage.

As discussed in section 1, the evidence

indicates that fund advances from Defendant to Plaintiff were
loans, which were at least partially repaid.

Lee acknowledged

that funds advanced to Cotton were loans, which she was told
would be repaid.

Plaintiff claimed the ranch as solely his on

his tax returns prior to the marriage.

(TT pp. 43-44).

Plaintiff had been involved in land purchases in the Moab area
since 1954 (TT p. 17), several years before he met Defendant
(TT p. 18). The McGinty ranch was purchased by Plaintiff alone
(TT p. 20), and was paid for by him out of his separate funds
(TT pp. 24-25).

Plaintiff listed several assets he owned prior

8

.v ^

n he

paying the init^c,
OWTl funds.

for the

p U r p O S e Of

^. ,.., . . ,t<= on the ranch out of his

r

(TT ;

sold

2 7 -29).
* >

conclude thai -~

. * ventuit cuu. -

the parties pr i • *

,

* h« - m a r n

-* mi ist

.4oxi existed . d^een
Defendant merely made

11 i i 11

:

Defendant's, were MM-I| In make the initial payment- <.. ..ie
ranch purchase..

Defendant had no proprietary i nterest
IBO: id i i ::: • s i iaii : =

r

ses.
Therefore

a t the t:i iii =s t h e p a r t i e s w e r e ' m a r r i e d ,
Il I lllii1 II"hi i

ranch was a separ a t e a s s i / l
earnings,

oi i t of which p u r c h a s e p r i c e

b e f o r e ai I I d u r i n g t h e marri a g e ( s e e
were a t t r i b u t a b l e

t o h i m.

s
-st

T>

^ n t n i s were p a i d

r-ef of A r o e l

^r

* i ranch

11 i P r e s t o i i v

o-p\

Supreme C o u r t r e v i e w e a

j ,

Lee c a n ^ . i ^ m no i:.__..._ ;

ranch d u e t o p u r c h a s e i n s t a l l m e n t s p a i d out
Preston,

646 r . ^ u

/UJ

'* * *

income.

*- K e

. , J v o r c e ca.

.

^tah
i i a »urt

had d e c r e e d t h a t e a c h p a r t y s h o u l d r e c e i v e

* *io s e p a r a t e

ptopi'it 1 *

--rda

-

,^u;

. .w

III Mm11||in!

Unck i tli.it. d e c r e e ,
the t r i a l

•
Lhe Supreme ^

U

n

• * n Utah l a w .
T T

* as e r r o r

c o u r t t o award t h e w i l e a s h a r e of p r o p e r t y

W I I III | i I ' m ' H t M i j

the

I 1 i mi ni ni

5 S * *.
III

for

purchased
-'d

prior to marriage.

It was required that the decree be modified

so that the husband would be given credit for his separate
property contribution, as well as the proportion of
appreciation in value attributable thereto.

Id., at 706.

Likewise, when as here Plaintiff individually entered a
contract for purchase of the ranch several years prior to his
marriage to Defendant and paid the initial purchase
installments out of his separate funds, Defendant is not
entitled to any ownership interest for payments made on the
ranch out of ranch income.

The only payments Defendant can

show that she made toward the purchase of the ranch were a few
miscellaneous transfers from her separate assets to the ranch
account during marriage, and the portion of the final payoff
that was not repaid to her from Plaintiff.

It was error for

the trial court to hold that Defendant is entitled to a onehalf interest in the ranch.
In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the
court noted that the trial court should "first properly
categorize the parties property as part of the marital estate
or as the separate property of one or the other.

Each party is

presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property."

Id. at 1022

(quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990).
Premarital property is viewed as separate property, and
10

tito separate
property . * ucri* :

' i.t mai ri,

• r*- - Apr

-n v . Watson, o.l < I , . il

ause a joint venture could not have

existed

was

Plaintiff's separate propeit>

he s;^...^ , d a i n upon

0,

if f i^i'™*" bindings h-ive not hee 1 naa^ r

divorce
why h.. . .

separ a;

demonstrate

. . ; -

o

Defendant.
•piie t^r>+. ; ^ ^ „ ,
were conscious

.

4

, ,., n^rt:oc

.-

indicates that they

•

assets,

Plaintiff testified that during the marnaqe consideration was
cgi ve

' :i'b ia

action w i^ ae^xu^v.* g a i n s t .

^^,- ».* ^ P ^ t y , but that

(

.

in !"i

Ill,

during the marriage, Defendant removed Plaintiff as her
i nxiu with her b r o t h ^
1+

sister, because sht : C i i tiici
money."

'TT :

.

>• i
y

" was my business,

*efend,

is well as Plaintiff,
<~parciLe premarita. arsrts,

error *.

*..*.: . a:n; _:: .; separate proper^ ^

:

, t

into the marriaae :--. marital property.
**

.ope 1 IanL- s

Brief as Addendum } * showb thai ilk- partita

dua^iags in real

estate before carriage were more fcrma ! f* •• a i*- facto joint
VT :

-.

11

!

;

in the Miller Property, it was done unequivocally, in writing.
When the parties became joint owners of real estate, they were
clear about it.

This supports Plaintiff's testimony that he

made a conscious decision not to own the ranch jointly with
Defendant.

The trial court's holding that the ranch was a

joint venture and marital property is not supported by
sufficiently detailed reasoning, nor by the evidence as a
whole.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED AS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Numerous cases stand for the principle that a
property division that is clearly erroneous should be modified.
E.g., Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Holm v.
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992); Munns v. Munns, 790
P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990).

Likewise here, where no joint

venture could have existed prior to the parties marriage, and
any contributions Defendant made toward payments on the
property during the marriage were minor, awarding each party
half of the ranch is clear error.

This court should hold that

the ranch is Plaintiff's separate property, or in the
alternative, hold that Defendant is entitled to only a
proportionate ownership which corresponds to her contributions
to the property.
VI.

CASE LAW SUPPORTS A PRO-RATA DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES.
12

Plaintiff
property,

~:~sertr

>-^r>,v*

.. ^

?

separate

a ^d a s su c ~ , .,

event t h a t t h e cour-

iu;:ds thai

I Hir i linsoi I

:•

. portion

* r.ne r a n c : . was

~~~* , ^,-, . - * ^r- - a n c h w a c

•

purchased

w

property

; proportion \. - -.he contributions, made o\

each party.

There is considerable case support for non-equal
division of marital property <*i - - .*
wmu> c
iz//-/o ii'Un ivb/;
(TTtah l^?^r

i^ equitable and justified

. , i^ewrneye. .

"

>., ricman v. Workman, »' ' p w ^

navis_v._Dav!

-

*

.^

> (Utah 1982);
*~,~^±.

Halx

Burt, 799 P . 2 Q I lot
have a limited nowe
party getL ..

Uuaii : \'\

i
•
.

t\^»v

ii'c i.uui t does

iepart from the general v^- es that each
fc

,

that marital property is divided evenJ>*
-n^^ r.^n.-i

•

*..-,t "lar1'*^1 Tropert" because it w-^

owne
i mi. 1 - *
existed.

etwer'i Piaintift and befenda - c.
Althoug5

n i. riave

*ien warranted by the circumstances, the

court has power t. aepart from the genetai tiih

'"I" rl

I

i in. h,

as separate property, should go ::./. -he plaintirt, awarding half
I M

in i Ill I

Defendant •- ~ • justifiable.

As explained in

pages 11-13 of Appellant's brief, at most Defendant should get
a 21 percent interest in the ranch.
Defendant's claims on pages 31-32 of Appellee's
brief, that she contributed more toward the purchase of the
ranch than did Plaintiff, cannot be accepted.

Though she

asserts that an examination of the trial transcript provides
"undisputed evidence" of seven conclusions that indicate she
had more of an interest in the ranch than did Plaintiff, most
of those conclusions are the subject of dispute herein.

First,

Plaintiff testified that he made the original $10,000 payment
out of his own funds, not funds advanced by Defendant.
page 24)

(TT,

Second, he also asserts that Defendant had no

ownership interest in, and was not entitled to any ranch
income.

Third, Defendant asserts in her brief that she

transferred amounts of $1,500.25 and $1,800.00 to plaintiff
right before the second annual payment was due. However,
Plaintiff's exhibit 1 shows that the $20,3 00.00 second
installment was due on June 1, 1971, and was paid on May 28,
1971.

(Addendum H to Brief of Appellant)

Defendant's exhibit

27 shows that the $1,800.00 check was written on June 8, 1971,
and the $1,500.25 check was written on March 24, 1972, both
after Plaintiff had already made the second installment.
(Addendum I to Appellant's Brief)

Fourth, Plaintiff asserts

that much of the final payoff, paid from Defendant's funds, was
14

r

a sound lega

,,r

:s separ,*<

* urn

proviued the nitai

>ui.cliasp price.
the ranch -

^ d* uaej :.

^

In ~ h* P ent

. nnp_. a

*-^n,-h should be awarder :. . . : * ..

* ":-=- greater

oorrecponc

- . v., ~v-;,,,-,-i , ,- K - s funds
Plaintiff r\3s i J u b U a t e u

- , ,^„ A .,,,_

.

contribution? i-^vai i the ranch purchase m«perct,

*

* *
^

.».

at inc. t

'

Flamtii : tree oL Delenaaui

awarded

.

.^HL

should equitablw hf ^ppor^ionod onlv 2. percent
the rancn, wii.

arrw

* not

u»na^:r.
r*nership
* naxnxriy /^

percent.
DEFENDANT ™ ^ U L D NOT BE AWARDED RULE n
Del en J^... *.:.^. ^

^

SANCTIONS.

*- j

)

damages under Rule 3J ot the* I'tdh I^uiei- ^L Appellate Procedure

property divisio-

the divoice decree
i * f i r ^ ^~'i *"K^

tilt:

d l L e i f i d t JL V e ,

u*..*w.u.*

„ ' . •.

w

• - • ,-t,rt should

-*Tn*"'s -•*^ ^ r d e

» .ri, rit 1 1 f

•

according to their respective contributions toward the purchase
prn.'f.'f » •

') '.
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A frivolous appeal is "[o]ne in which no justiciable
question has been presented and . . . is readily recognizable
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can
ever succeed."

Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 169 (Utah App.

1992) (quoting Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990)).
Because this appeal is meritorious, the decree should be
modified, and no basis for sanctions under Rule 33 exists.

See

Holm, at 169; Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App.
1990).
Only extremely egregious appeals are subject to
sanctions.

"[S]anctions for filing frivolous appeals are

'applied only in egregious cases, lest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court
decisions. ,lf

Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App.

1992) (quoting Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App.
1989)) (holding that although appellant's arguments were based
on a strained reading of the probate code, this was not an
egregious case where all counsel would recognize that arguments
made on appeal are without merit).

C.f. Call v. City of West

Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah App. 1990) ("Although bordering
perilously close to being frivolous, we do not find the issues
brought in this appeal to be so because of the confusion
engendered by the previous litigation."); Munns, 790 P.2d at
123 ("With respect to the issues upon which respondent
16
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